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Roger Ballard 
 
Introduction 
 
That ethnic and racial disjunctions are, de f cto, one of the most serious, and indeed one of 
the most explosive, sources of socio-political tension in the contemporary world is plain to 
see: all but the very smallest island-based societies, whether in the “developed” or the 
“under-developed” world, are more or less severely fissured in this way. Yet despite the
salience of these disjunctions, much confusion still remains – not le st amongst social 
scientists themselves – as to how the structure of such plural societies can best be 
conceptualised, and hence as to how the construction of their various component sections, as 
well as their mutual dialectics can best be described and understood. With this in mind it is 
worth remembering that it is not long since it was almost universally assumed that the very 
existence of divisions was the outcome of intrinsically ir ationa  patterns of prejudice. Hence 
– or so it was supposed – as the world’s inhabitants became ever more prosperous, and hence 
more intellectually sophisticated and educationally informed, disjunctions of this kind would 
steadily fade into a condition of ever-greater insignificance.  
 Although the universalistic assumptions which underpinned these expectations soon 
became an article of faith right across the political spectrum, from Marxists on the left to 
liberal free-marketeers on the right, it is nevertheless worth remembering that the Western 
European social and political arenas within which these ideas were initially generated also 
played host to some equally powerful anti-universalistic counter-currents. Amongst the most 
important of these was the notion the world’s population was intrinsically non-homogeneous. 
Rather it was held to be divided into a large number of separate nations, each of which was 
marked off from all others by virtue of its members distinctive religious, cultural, linguistic 
and/or biological heritage. Hence whilst a commitment to universalism, and hence to the 
illegitimacy and indeed irrationality of sustaining racial and ethnic disjunctions, was a central 
feature of the Western Eu opean enlightenment, such notions were by no means left 
unchallenged. On the contrary the view that national self-expression articulated through a 
democratically constituted nation-state was by far the most just and effective means of 
articulating the popular will was just as important a product of Western European thinking 
during the same period, and has swept the globe with equal if not greater impact during the 
course of the past century. 
 The results of these two deeply contradictory trends are now plain to see. Whilst all 
the Imperial structures  whether Mughal or Ottoman, Chinese or Czarist, British or Austro-
Hungarian  which had hitherto been such a salient feature of the global order have been 
systematically swept away, it is not so much universalism, but r ther the nation-s ate which 
has universalised itself. So it is that at an organisational level nation-states have become 
ubiquitous. To be sure some of the new units, such as Afghanistan and Somalia, have 
imploded in tatters. Nevertheless following the collapse of the Soviet Union, every formal 
Imperial structure has come to an end, and the United Nations has grown to include nearly 
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two hundred separate members. But if the idea of universalism in the sense of an ever-
increasing tendency towards global homogeneity has proved to be an empty dream, a 
powerful commitment towards what can usefully be identified as a lesser form universalism 
has now sprung up, paradoxically enough, within t e boundaries of almost every 
contemporary nation state. The reason for this is equally plain to see. At the heart of almost 
every nationalist program is an expectation that the people who make up the nation are - or 
should at least be actively committed to making themselves - ethnically and linguistically 
homogeneous.1  
 Nevertheless this dream is also proving to be equally elusive. However much its’ 
supporters have sought to achieve a condition of comprehensive religious, linguistic and 
cultural homogeneity, virtually every contemporary nation-state is marked by some degree of 
ethnic plurality. Nor is this condition merely a temporary aberration: everywhere one looks, 
although for a whole host of differing reasons, that condition of plurality is becoming more 
and not less salient. Britain is no exception to this trend. Over and above the differences 
between the United Kingdom’s three regional components of England, Scotland and Wales, 
additional dimensions of diversity have been introduced by the growth of substantial minority 
populations of less indigenous origin. Larely as a result of the ever-increasing demand for 
additional labour which accompanied the process of nineteenth and twentieth century 
industrial expansion, large numbers of migrant workers were drawn into mainland Britain 
from overseas. And whilst some of those settlers were physically indistinguishable from their 
more indigenous counterparts, as in the case of members of the Jewish and Irish Catholic 
communities, others were much more readily identifiable. This was particularly so during the 
course of the past half century, during which the majority of newcomers traced their ancestral 
roots to one part or another of Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Hence Britain’s visible 
minority population now includes around three million people, or some six percent of the 
population as a whole.2 
  Analysing the extent and significance of Britain’s resultant condition of pluralism is, 
however, proving to be a major sociological challenge. Just what kind of structural positions 
have each of these minorities come to occupy in the wider social order? Is their behaviour 
becoming steadily more akin to that of the indigenous majority – as universalistic 
expectations suggested both would and should occur? Or are each of the new minorities 
sustaining a sense of their own distinctiveness? In any event just what trajectories of 
adaptation has each group followed since the earliest pioneers established a toehold in their 
new environment? Have they followed the path of comprehensive cultural assimilation which 
supporters of the nationalist v riant of universalism insisted must take place? Or have some – 
or all – of these groups successfully sustained a degree of ethnic autonomy? Moreover just 
what have been the consequence of these strategies? How far have those involved, whether 
theirs is a visible or an invisible minority, remained trapped in the unattractive jobs and 
houses to which they were initially assigned? And how far, to the contrary, have they 
managed to challenge the exclusionism to which they were exposed, and to push their way 
upwards and outwards to positions of greater prosperity? And if they have indeed succeeded 
in so doing, is their success an indicator of the absence of racial and ethnic exclusionism, or 
is it better understood as an indicator of the extent to which those involved have used the 
                                         
1 As Garibaldi famously put it immediately after having gained political control of Italy in 1861, AWe=ve made 
Italy, now we must make Italians@. 
2 See Ballard, R., and Kalra, V.S., The Ethnic Dimensions of the 1991 Census: A preliminary Report 
(Manchester: Manchester Census Group, 1994). 
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resources of their distinctive cultural capital to devise strategies which have enabled them to 
overcome those constraints?  
 
Gearing up for an ethnic question: the UK Census of 1991  
    
Until recently lack of data made it virtually mpossible to explore these questions with any 
degree of clarity or confidence. Nor was this situation easy to remedy, given that any attempt 
even to broach such issues could be perceived as intrinsically anti-u iversalist and therefore 
“racist”. Hence the very proposal that a question on ethnic affiliation might be included in the 
Census – and by extension in all manner of other data-collection exercises – invariably 
encountered vociferous opposition, much of which was articulated by otherwise liberal-
minded sociological commentators.3 Yet however well meaning their objections may have 
been, the analytical consequences of their arguments were quite disastrous. In the absence of 
the clear-cut statistical data all discussions about the shape, size and social characteristics of 
Britain’s minority communities – let alone of the extent to which Britain was in fact 
becoming a plural society – became a matter of more or less impressionistic guesswork. 
 Against this background the inclusion of a deliberately formulated ethnic question in 
the 1991 Census (although not, paradoxically enough, in the version of the Census schedule 
used in Ulster), and the consequent use of a similar question in all manner of other data 
collection exercises, was undoubtedly a major step forward. To be sure there were many 
deficiencies in the format of the question which was deployed, not least because it was solely 
concerned with identifying the visible components of Britain’s minority population. That 
said, the exercise has nevertheless b en of considerable utility, for it has generated a vast 
mass of data about the social, economic and demographic characteristics of the six most 
salient components of this section of Britain’s population. Moreover despite its limitations 
this data has lso become available at a particularly opportune moment, given that a full half 
a century has now passed since the process of mass migration from Britain’s former Imperial 
possessions began.  
 As a result of the length and intensity of Britain’s involvement in Imperial activities, 
its population has had a long history of more or less intimate contact with its non-European 
subjects. Although there has been a small non-Europea  presence in Britain ever since the 
West African trade began to open up during the course of the sixteenth century, it was not 
until the post second world war economic boom took off – such that large sections of British 
industry began to run acutely short of labour – that non-European migrants began to settle in 
Britain in substantial numbers. Whilst this migrant inflow which was largely responsible for 
the growth of Britain’s current visible minority presence, it is essential to emphasise (if only 
because the point is so often forgotten) that immigration itself was by no means a novel 
phenomenon. During previous episodes of rapid industrial expansion migrant workers had 
been drawn in from rather nearer at hand, and most especially from Ireland and Eastern 
Europe. But by the early nineteen fifties these traditional reservoirs were well nigh exhaust d, 
with the result that additional hands began to be drawn in from much further afield. But this 
new window of opportunity – at least from the migrants’ point of view – did not remain open 
for long. Although the demand for labour stayed high, from the mid nineteen sixties onwards 
                                         
3 The presentations made by Robert Moore and Attam Vetta to a Select Committee of the House of Commons 
(Home Affairs Committee, Ethnic and Racial Questions in the Census, HC 33-1, 1983) are a particularly clear 
example of such arguments.  
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ever more draconian restrictions began to be imposed on the entrance of migrant workers 
from South Asia and the Caribbean, in an effort to assuage growing popular hostility to their 
presence. Yet despite the vigour of ppular demands to “halt immigration”, the authorities 
soon discovered that the inflow was far from easy to turn off, largely because it was hard to 
prevent those who had already arrived (most of whom were men) from exercising their rights 
of family reunion. Hence the inflow continued to increase for some while – although the 
pattern varied as between different groups – before it finally fell away.  Hence most visible 
minorities’ peak period of settlement occurred at least a quarter of a century ago.  
 Like all other migrant workers, South Asian and Afro-Caribbean settlers soon found 
that on arrival they had little alternative but to start right at the bottom of the pile, and thus to 
take the jobs and to live in the houses which more established members of the local 
population  some of whom were immigrants from an earlier era  were only too willing to 
abandon in favour of better opportunities elsewhere. Yet despite this initial condition of 
structural disadvantage, which was, of course, very similar to that wh ch heir Jewish and 
Irish Catholic predecessors had also experienced, they were no less committed to overcoming 
those difficulties in the longer run. But all migrants soon realise, upward mobility in an alien 
and often hostile environment can rarely, ifev r, be reaped overnight. More often than not it 
was their locally-born children, rather than members of the migrant generation themselves, 
who were most likely to reap the full benefits of their enterprise.  
 Once set in this context, the full significance of the inclusion of an ethnic question in 
the 1991 Census springs into focus. Half a century has now passed since mass migration 
began, and in most communities at least a quarter of a century since the inflow reached its 
peak. Hence we are now in an excellent position to begin to assess how each of these 
communities has fared during the intervening years, and thus how far their hopes of upward 
mobility have in fact materialised; secondly, and perhaps most significantly, we can now 
begin to explore just how varied these trajectories of adaptation have proved to be.  
Racial disadvantage and ethnic resourcefulness 
 
Whilst the inclusion of an ethnic question in 1991 Census as well as in the 4th National 
Survey of Ethnic Minorities conducted by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI),4  has at long last 
provided us with the statistical wherewithal with which to address such questions, making 
sense of the results is turning out to raise some far more complex issues than most 
sociological commentators appear to have expected.  
 To date the great majority of sociologists have taken the view that in analytical terms 
the most important distinguishing feature of the new minorities was their physical visibility, 
or to put it more precisely, the routine tendency of members of Britains indigenous majority 
to use physical appearance as a marker of alterity; and to the extent that this is so everyone 
who can be identified as “not-white” is subjected to a more or less intense degree of racial 
exclusionism, thus placing them in a measurable position of racial disadvantage. That there is 
considerable force in this perspective is now beyond doubt: as members of this section of the 
population routinely report, in almost every conceivable circumstance their physical 
distinctiveness i  taken into account by members of the “white” majority; and the consequent 
tendency towards racial marginalisation is particularly strong whenever they find themselves 
                                         
4 T. Modood, R. Berthoud, J. Lakey, J. Nazroo, P. Smith, S Virdee and S. Beishon, Ethnic Minorities in Britain: 
Diversity and Disadvantage (London: Policy Studies Institute 1997) 
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in direct competition with members of the indigenous majority for access to the same set of 
scarce resources.  
 Yet however severe the negative consequences of their inherited physical 
distinctiveness may be (for the implications of having an expensively acquired sun-tan are of 
course quite different), it is surely quite wrong to conclude – as all too many sociologists 
seem prepared to assume – that the social fate of everyone subjected to such denigratory 
treatment will be entirely determined by that experience, or indeed that “Black” people in this 
sense will form anything like the homogeneous population category that such racist usage 
inevitably suggests. Quite the contrary. Whilst the almost obsessional concern with hereditary 
differences in physical appearance which most white Britons display may indeed generate a 
common experience of exclusion amongst embers of the visible minorities, from their own 
perspective those so identified may well share little or nothing else in common. Hence 
however angered they may all feel about their white compatriots’ bizarre attitudes, it most 
certainly does not follow that every single aspect of the lives of members of Britain’s “not-
white” population is primarily determined that experience. Nor are their responses to those 
constraints uniform either. Although members of every section of the visible minority 
population have now begun to devise strategies with which to contest and resist their 
exclusion, these are proving to be neither homogeneous nor uniform. 
 Nor is it hard so see why minority reactions to their experience of exclusionism have 
been far more varied than he myopic assumptions of the sociological establishment has 
hitherto been prepared to acknowledge. However homogeneous that category of people who 
have been successively identified as “coloured”, as “immigrants” and now as “Black” may 
have seemed to “White” observers, what all of these labels have served to obscure is the 
extent to which those so identified were in fact affiliated to a multitude of differing 
communities, each with its own very specific roots; and that however much white observers 
may have dismissed the significance of these affiliations, it is through the prism of their own 
specific social, cultural, linguistic, familial and religious heritage that every group of settlers 
has set about constructing networks of mutual support – communities, in other words – the 
better to survive and resist the unwelcome forces of racial exclusionism to which they were 
all to frequently subjected. Hence rather than seeking to bring their personal lifestyles into 
comprehensive conformity with indigenous norms as fast as they possibly could  as most 
“white” observers naively expected they would and should  most members of the visible 
minorities have followed precisely the opposite course. By looking to each other for mutual 
support they have generated ever more elaborate ethnic aggregations of their own. Nor were 
these developments in any way unprecedented. To the extent that the new minorities have 
settled together in residential clusters within which they have made elaborate efforts to 
rebuild their personal and domestic lives on their own terms, they are following strategies 
which are very closely akin to those deployed by their less immediately visible Jewish and 
Irish predecessors.  
 The broad outcome of these processes is now plain to see. On the one hand Britain 
become a society which is significantly multi-racial, so much so that between a quarter and a 
third of the newly born children in many of its major industrial cities are now born to parents 
of non-European ancestry; and on the other its social order has become much more overtly 
plural in the sense that its inhabitants now display a wider variety of personal and domestic 
lifestyles than ever before.  
 Yet just what are the implications of these developments, and how is their wider 
significance – not least from the perspective of social policy – best understood? Although 
many members of Britain’s indigenous majority undoubtedly regard the increasing salience 
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of ethnic plurality with considerable alarm, largely on the grounds that it represents an 
unacceptable challenge to the integrity of the established social order, and despite the equally 
widespread tendency to use these perceptions as a further justification for exclusionistic 
practices, it is now becoming increasingly clear that the new minoritis have by no means 
been overwhelmed by all this. Not only have they managed to stand their ground and defend 
their own interests, but very often to prosper despite all these difficulties. And this, in turn, 
prompts yet more questions: just how far, and how comprehensively, have the new minorities 
managed to overcome the obstacles they have encountered, and if so when, where, and on 
what basis?  
The findings of the 1991 Census 
 
With this in mind one of the most significant outcomes of the 1991 Census – which have 
been further underlined by the results of PSI’s Fourth National Survey – is that although the 
visible minorities may indeed have been pressed into the position of a comprehensively 
deprived underclass when they first arrived in Britain, and althoughthey were hit with 
disproportionate severity by the impact of the industrial recession of the early 1980s, the 
grossest forms of social inequality as between the “White” majority and the “non-white”
minorities have by now been almost entirely eliminated. Indeed as the figures in Table 1 
demonstrate, by the time the Census was conducted in 1991 there was – remarkably enough – 
very little difference in the aggregate distribution by social class of the visible minorities as 
opposed to the white majority, no less s  amongst women than amongst men. Nor is that all. 
At the younger end of the age spectrum (which is, of course, the sphere which provides the 
best indication of the likely direction of future trends) members of the minorities have now 
begun to outperform the indigenous majority. 
 
Table 1:  Percentage distribution by Social Class of White and Non-White men and women 
by age-group 
 
     Aged 18 -29     Aged 30 - 44      Aged 45-59    Aged 60 + 
Men White Non-White White Non-White White Non-White White Non-White 
Professionals 5.8 7.3 8.2 10.4 7.3 9.3 6.6 6.6 
Managers 20.4 22.2 33.3 28.4 32.3 22.3 26.4 15.1 
Non-manual 14.8 20.5 9.5 10.4 8.5 9.3 9.7 9.5 
Skilled manual 32.7 24.8 31.3 28.1 32.3 28.5 31.4 28.3 
Semi-skilled 17.1 16.5 1.9 15.9 14 21.2 18.5 25.1 
Unskilled 5.5 4 3.4 3.4 4.2 6.8 6.2 12.5 
Women         
Professionals 2.4 3.6 2.2 3.1 1 1.9 1 1.1 
Managers 25.1 21.9 32.2 31.3 27.5 33.4 22.2 30.4 
Non-manual 45.1 49.6 36.2 29.9 35.4 14.1 34.1 10.1 
Skilled manual 7.7 5.2 6.1 6.2 7.3 7.4 6.8 7.8 
Semi-skilled 15.2 14.5 15.8 22.9 16.9 28.8 17.6 25.8 
Unskilled 3 2.4 6.8 4.4 11.1 12.2 17.2 22.2 
 
Source: 1991 Census Ethnic Group and Country of Birth Topic Report, Table 10 
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But if these figures provide the clearest possible evidence of just how inappropriate it now is 
to categorically identify Britains visible minority as an underclass, this generalisation 
nevertheless conceals at least as much as it reveals, for one of the great merits of the ethnic 
question is that it enables us to cut our way through the stereotypical focus on skin colour 
which is so characteristic of “White” discourse, and to explore the differential experiences of 
the major internal components of the visible minority population. In these terms another 
striking feature of the Census re lts – also confirmed by the findings of the PSI’s Fourth 
National Survey – is the very high level of differentiation which has now begun to emerge as 
between different subsections of the visible minority population. . These are so great that in 
virtually every sphere of activity which we are now in a position to explore, inter-minority 
differences are invariably substantially greater than those between the “Whites” and “non-
whites” as a whole. In other words “non-whites” differ more from each other than they do 
from “Whites”. 
 Finding a way of comprehensibly representing the character of these differentials, let 
alone of suggesting just how they may have arisen, has turned out to be an even more 
challenging task than I initially envisaged. Nevertheless I hop  that the preliminary attempts 
that I have made to do so will prove to be reasonably illuminating. With this in mind the 
figures set out in Tables 2 to 5 disaggregate in ever increasing detail the association between 
ethnic affiliation and socio-e onomic status, with the object of showing just how substantial 
(and how varied) the scale and complexity of these patterns of variation have now become. 
Looking first of all at Table 2, which explores the relationship between age and socio-
economic status amongst non-White men, the data are displayed in three columns. The first 
shows the number of men of that age-group found in each socio-economic group, (based on a 
10% sample of the UK population), the second the percentage of men in that age group who 
are members of that category, whilst the third shows the ratio between that figure and the 
percentage of White men in that self-s m  category. Hence a figure of 1.0 in the ratio column 
indicates that those figures are identical, a figure of 2.0 that minority men are twice as 
frequently found in that category, and 0.5 that their presence there is only half as great. Table 
3 has a similar format, but shows the figures for women rather than men. 
 
  
 <Tables 2 and 3 about here>
 
There are, of course, some problems with these figures, most especially when 
numbers in the underlying cell size are small: amongst, for example, large employers, or 
farmers and agricultural workers, of whom there relatively few in the population at large, or 
amongst older Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, of whom only a tiny and very 
unrepresentative proportion are economically active. These reservations apart, the underlying 
counts in most parts of these Tables are sufficiently large for calculated results to be of 
reasonable statistical significance, and yet further confirm the broad pattern of upward 
mobility indicated by the aggregate figures in Table 1. Thus whilst non-white me  f all age 
groups may still be significantly over-repr sented (ratio>2.0) amongst personal service 
workers, they are also similarly over-represented amongst small employers; meanwhile the 
only areas in which they are substantially under-represented (ratio<0.5) is in agriculture, and 
amongst the older age groups as managers in large establishments. Meanwhile young non-
white women are now gradually beginning to make a significant showing – t least in relative 
terms – as small employers and self-employed professionals, even if older women are still 
strongly over-represented in semi-skilled manual work.  
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 <Tables 4 and 5 about here> 
 
Yet if Tables 2 and 3 provide further indications of the extent to which the visible 
minorities have begun to move upwards through the socio-economi  pile, Tables 4 and 5, 
which further disaggregates the ratio calculations set out in the previous pair of Tables by 
ethnic group, demonstrates that this pattern of upward mobility is by no means uniform, 
either in its extent, its direction, or in its gendering, across the various minority groups we are 
now in a position to identify. Taking the percentage distribution of the majority population by 
socio-economic group as our yardstick once again, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and 
Chinese men of all ages turn out to be particularly strongly over-represented amongst small 
employers, whilst Bangladeshi and Chinese men are hugely over-represented in the “personal 
service workers”. Evidence from elsewhere in the Census – which it would be tedious to 
present in detail here – suggests that this is a result of their heavy (but nevertheless 
differential) concentration in the restaurants, take-aways and taxi-dr ving. What is also 
striking about Table 4, however, is the striking degree of upward mobility into professional 
activities - on both an employed and self-emp oyed basis - which has by now been achieved 
by the Chinese and the Indians, and to a rather lesser extent by the Pakistanis and the 
Africans. Meanwhile Table 5 shows that some equally complex, but rather differently 
patterned, differentials have also begun to emerge amongst visible minority women. To be 
sure their current levels of achievement are on the face of it rather less great than those of 
their male counterparts: this is only to be expected given that in their case the forces of racial 
exclusionism will be further supplemented by those of gender. Yet if older minority women 
are still heavily concentrated (and hence over-represented) in various forms of manual work, 
this tendency is a good deal less salient at the other end of the age spectrum. Moreover in 
some groups, and most notably so amongst the Afro-Caribbeans, younger women have now 
begun significantly to outperform their male counterparts (although not white women) in 
gaining access to managerial, professional and semi-professional jobs. Beyond this Table 5 
also suggests that some even more substantial changes may well be in the pipeline, since in 
all six minority groups women aged between 18 and 29 display a very substantial (although 
inter-ethnically variable) degree of upward mobility in comparison with their counterparts in 
the two older cohorts.5  
  
The interaction between racial inequality and ethnic diversity  
 
How can we best make sense of these exceedingly complex outcomes, which are replicated in 
almost every area of social activity which we are now in a position to explore? And howeve  
                                         
5 It is also worth commenting on the extraordinarily levels of success with which older Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi women, and to a slightly lesser extent their Indian counterparts, appear to have gained entry into 
professional self- mployment. Whilst the data itself is accurate enough in its own terms, it must be remembered 
that the this section of the Census only counts persons who are “economically active”, or in other words 
engaged in formal paid employment of one kind or another; and although a large proportion of older Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi women are ill-paid homeworkers, (for many are most reluctant to take employment in non-
domestic contexts) they are officially classified as “economically inactive”. But although the propor ion of older 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi women who are economically active according to these criteria is very low, those that 
are in paid employment are for the most part drawn from a small professional e ite f Doctors. The figures in 
most other parts of table 5 can only be properly understood in the light of a similar intimate knowledge of the 
sociological character of the underlying community.  
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imperfectly focussed the statistical pictures which we are currently able to generate may be, 
how can we best begin to approach the task of exploring the character of, together with the 
interaction between, all the social, economic, historical and cultural processes which have 
given rise to these outcomes? Moreover if this task poses all sorts of analytical challenges, it 
is also worth reminding ourselves that when the current ethnic question was actually framed, 
few of those who were actually responsible for the whole exercise seem to have envisaged 
that the results would be anything like so complex, or indeed so difficult to interpret, as they 
have actually turned out to be. 
 As I argued in an earlier contribution to Patterns of Prejudice,6 virtually everyone 
who participated in the debate about the pros and cons of including an ethnic question in the 
Census not only appear to have taken it for granted that the central object of the exercise was 
to identify the “not-White” component of Britain’s population, but also that by far the most 
important analytical filter through which the results of the initiative would be processed was 
that of “racial disadvantage”. Hence as the House of Commons Select Committee Report 
which formally set the ball rolling quite explicitly put it: ‘The object of asking ethnic 
questions is, in conjunction with other indicators of general disadvantage, to assist 
Government and local authorities to identify and work against all aspects of racial 
disadvantage and racial discrim nation.’7 If members of the sociologically inexpert Select 
committee could perhaps be forgiven for following vernacular usage by assuming that the 
concepts of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ could legitimately be regarded as virtually synonymous 
analytical categories, and for going on from that position to wrap up the whole exercise 
within the further assumption that discrimination and disadvantage were principal issues 
which the results of asking the new question would serve to highlight, what is very striking is 
that in the aftermath of the whole exercise the vast majority of academic commentators 
appear to have been content to operate within a similarly structured analytical universe.  
 Although this tendency can certainly be identified in many of the commentaries on 
the results of the 1991 Census,8 it is particularly – and very illuminatingly – manifest in the 
fourth (and broadly sociological) volume on Ethnicity in the 1991 Census which has recently 
been published by the Office for National Statistics.9 Almost every Chapter in the volume 
points to the presence of very considerable inter-minority variation, so much so that in her 
concluding overview the editor, Valerie Karn, goes out of her way to emphasise her 
agreement with Blackburn, Dale and Jarmans conclusion that  
 
Conventional perceptions of immigrants forming an ‘underclass’ or otherwise 
sharing a common experience of deprivation are unsound. This is not to deny that 
ethnic minorities, or at least those not classified as White, suffer disadvantages; 
the evidence on lifestyles and unemployment show this. However, their 
experiences are not homogeneous and they are not passive victims.10 
                                         
6 “Negotiating Race and ethnicity: exploring the implications of the 1991 Census” in Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 
30 No. 3, pp 3 - 3. 
7 Home Affairs Committee, Ethnic and Racial Questions in the Census, HC 33-1, 1983, p. ix 
8 See, for example, my review article “The construction of a Conceptual Vision: ‘Ethnic Groups’ and the 1991 
UK Census” in Racial and Ethnic Studies, Vo.20, pp. 182 – 194. 
9 Karn, Valerie (ed.) Ethnicity and the census Volume 4: Employment, Education and Housing amongst the 
ethnic minority populations of Great Britain (London: Office for National Statistics, 1997). 
10 Karn (ed.), 282). The contributors to the PSI’s Fourth National Survey reach a similar conclusion when they 
suggest that ‘Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are consistently at a disadvantage with respect to white people, and 
often with respect to other minorities …. People of Caribbean and Indian origin are often found to experience 
disadvantage, though it is usually less serious …… Chinese people and East African Asians have reached a 
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Even so neither she, nor any of the other contributors to the volume, make any serious 
attempt to break out of the procrustean limitations of what I have described elsewhere as the 
“deprivationist paradigm”.11 So it is that even though Karn immediately goes on to cite 
Malcolm Cross’s comment to that ‘to speak of “the Black experience” to signify all the 
richness of the Diaspora is both to simplify the everyday processes of exclusion and to 
minimise the creativity of response’ with approval,12 she m kes no effort whatsoever to 
explore the possible impact of ethnic creativity. On the contrary she returns immediately to 
the language of deprivationism by suggesting that ‘there is one respect in which one can 
speak of a general “Black experience”, namely that all minority groups suffer a “penalty”, 
albeit of varying size, relative to the White population.’Hence the central objective of Karn’s 
Chapter, and in a more general sense of the whole volume, is to assess the extent to which the 
visible minorities suffer from such an ‘ethnic penalty’, and to outline the steps which she 
believes should be taken  largely through reinforcing the powers of the Commission for 
Racial Equality  to reduce or better still to eliminate the impact of this penalty. 
 Yet although the worthiness of Karns concern to identify the nature and extent of 
this penalty is beyond question, just how adequate, nd above all how analytically 
illuminating is the conceptual perspective within the context of which she – along with a 
whole host of other sociological commentators – has chosen to articulate her arguments? In 
raising this query I should perhaps begin by mphasising just where any differences between 
us might lie, not least because I wholly agree with the proposition that all members of the 
visible minorities do indeed experience something which can quite legitimately be described 
as a ‘penalty’ as a result of the impact of white exclusionism. Hence it is not so much over 
whether or not the visible minorities find themselves penalised as result of the attitudes and 
behaviour of the White majority that that I would wish to differ from Karn (as well as from
the many other sociological analysts who operate within the context of a similar analytical 
perspective), but rather with respect to the vocabulary which she – and they – have chosen to 
deploy in order to investigate the phenomenon. Is the penalty e nic? Or is it more 
appropriate to identify it as racial? 
 At first sight this might well seem to be no more than an arcane terminological 
quibble, since in vernacular speech (just as in the Census itself) the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’ 
are routinely employed as virtual synonyms. Yet although words can mean, as the Red Queen 
insisted, “just what I choose them to mean, and neither more nor less”, this commonplace 
usage is having a quite disastrous impact – or so I would argue – on our ability to 
comprehend thechanges and developments which are currently taking place in our 
increasingly plural society. The central consequences of eliding these two terms – the first of 
which has only very recently come into widespread usage – are not difficult to identify. 
Firstly the term ethnicity now serves as a very convenient euphemism for the morally 
discredited concept of race. Yet precisely because it is deployed in this way, it follows that it 
may well enable its users to make exactly the same kind of social distinctions as were made 
in the past, but to do so on what can now be represented as a much more morally acceptable 
basis. Secondly this elision strongly confirms the popular view that it is the minorit es who 
“are different”, as opposed to the merely normal majority, who c nsequently see themselves 
                                                                                                                          
position of broad parity with the white population – behind on some indicators, perhaps, but ahead on others. It 
would be inappropriate to describe them as disadvantaged groups.’ (Modood et.al.) 
11 Ballard, Roger, "New Clothes for the Emperor? The Conceptual Nakedness of the British Race Relations 
Industry" in New Community Vol. 18, 1992  
12 Ibid. 
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as ‘not-ethnic’ – just as the vocabulary of the Census quite explicitly confirms. This has a 
further set of consequences, for if Whites are by definition ‘not-ethnic’, it follows that any 
possibility that this section of the population might have any kind of ethnic specificity, or 
more seriously still, that it might be ethnically heterogeneous, is simply ruled out of court in 
conceptual terms. The invisible minorities within its own ranks are, as it were “disappeared”. 
Lastly, and perhaps most of importantly of all, this usage firmly reinforces the position of 
ethnic privilege enjoyed by Britain’s established – and of course overwhelmingly E ish – 
elite. Not only does it serve to suggest that the established social order really is as 
homogeneous and as unresisted as those who stand at its heart would like everyone else to 
believe, but also enables them to identify as ‘normal’ – a d so put beyond the reach of 
analytical scrutiny – their own very specific interests, concerns a d characteristic modes of 
expression: the very stuff of hegemony. 
 In so far as it is an analytical discipline, the very purpose of social science is of course 
to disentangle and to lay bare the operation of such processes: and it also follows that a 
failure to do so is of necessity to conspire – whether consciously or unconsciously – in the 
maintenance of the hegemonic structures which such processes serve both to organise and 
legitimate. Terminology does matter, and all the more so f there is a prospect of it o rating 
as a Trojan horse which introduces a hegemonic perspective into the very heart of the 
analytical categories routinely deployed by social scientists. Unless this danger is actively 
guarded against, there is a very real prospect that the whole critical purpose of our analytical 
procedures will be undermined.  
 But if this is so, just how should we differentiate between the concepts of “race” and 
“ethnicity” in empirical terms? Always remembering the Red Queen’s ruling, there are 
nevertheless a whole series of crucial analytical issues which are worth disentangling here, all 
of which have to do with processes of boundary drawing. Boundary drawing occurs in all 
manner of situations, of course, but the basic logic of these processes is comparatively easy to 
spell out. Those involved need to begin by making a conceptual distinction between “them” 
and “us”, but once this is in place, the way is immediately open for the “us-es” – whoever 
they may be, and however they may have defined themselves – o begin to act in both an 
exclusive and an inclusive way, making every effort to distance themselves from “them” 
whilst simultaneously drawing together in solidarity with all other members of “us”; and of 
course the “them-s” – or more likely various sub-groups of the diverse population which the 
original “us-es” chose to classify as “them” – are very likely to reverse the process, and to 
play exactly the same game themselves.  
 Although all manner of social groups – from the most powerful to the most 
resourcel ss – undoubtedly have the capacity to mobilise in this way, the structural 
consequences of their activities differ. As Parkin has very usefully pointed out,13 the resulting 
processes of closure can conveniently be identified either as xclusionary (as when members 
of privileged groups who have much to lose and hence regard competitors of all sorts as most 
unwelcome), usurpationary (the strategy typically deployed by disprivileged groups who 
have little to lose and much to gain by challenging others), and dual (most frequently 
deployed by those in the middle, and whose objective is therefore both to exclude potential 
competitors from below whilst also challenging those who stand above them). Last but not 
least, the criteria deployed to organise and defend these boundaries, whether for the purposes 
of exclusionary or usurpationary closure, or – most commonly – in simultaneous pursuit of 
both these objectives, is specific to those involved in constructing them.  
                                         
13 Parkin, Frank Marxism and class theory: a bourgeois critique (London: Tavistock 1979) 
 
 12 
 Thus even though it is quite clear that most member  of Britain’s indigenous majority 
use hereditary skin colouration, together with the “objectionable” tendency of such people to 
sustain their own distinctive cultural traditions, as inescapable markers of “otherness”, such 
that those so identified find themselves subjected to various forms of racial penalty, it 
certainly does not follow that those so penalised will necessarily identify themselves on the 
same basis as their excluders do, and still less that they will begin to mobilise themselves in 
order to challenge the handicaps that they consequently encounter within the same 
ideological framework as that deployed by their excluders. On the contrary one of the most 
salient features of every plural society, no matter how great and well-insti utionalised its 
internal structures of social inequality may be, is that hegemonised minorities invariably 
make great efforts to sustain, and where necessary actively to cre te, an ide logical 
framework which differs from that promulgated by the elite, the better to resist their 
exclusion. Nor is that all. The usurpationary strategies deployed by the excluded tend to be 
particularly effective when those involved have ready access – as is normally the case 
amongst those of migrant origins – to a moral, linguistic and co ceptual order whose 
premises differ radically from those which underpin the hegemonic norm.14  
 From this perspective a further reason why it is only Britain’s visible minorities 
whose members are routinely perceived as ‘ethnic’ begins to come into focus, for it s 
precisely because they originate from far overseas – and not merely from the other side of the 
English channel or the Irish sea – that the resources on which they have drawn in devising 
their usurpationary strategies have indeed been radically unfamiliar, at least in terms of 
indigenous practices expectations. Hence there is, on the face of it, a certain logic in 
identifying everyone whose behaviour might be inspired by one or other of these alternative 
sets of social, cultural, familial, linguistic and religious resources as ‘ethnic’, and everyone 
else as not. If so, it might seem equally reasonable to suggest, paceKarn’s vocabulary, that 
since the disadvantages encountered by non-Europea  settlers and their offspring are 
precipitated by the exclusionary tactics routinely deployed by members of Britain’s 
indigenous majority, they could quite appropriately be described as an “ethnic penalty”.  
 Yet however harmless this terminology may seem, its inclusion in our analytical 
vocabulary cannot bear critical scrutiny. In the first place it is a misnomer: if members of 
Britain’s visible minorities find themselves penalised as a result of their exposure to 
exclusionism, it is not so much their own (and in their terms wholly positive) ethnic 
commitments which give rise to these penalties, but rather the negative judgements which are 
made about them – and which are in turn largely precipitated by stereotyped reactions to 
their distinctive physical appearance – which are the principal precipitants of exclusinary 
behaviour. Hence it is not Karn’s notion of a penalty which is in dispute, but whether the 
term ‘ethnic’ is the most appropriate means of identifying it. My own view is straightforward. 
If this penalty is the result of white exclusionism, we should stop beating about the bush: it is 
a racial penalty, and should be identified as such. But the argument does not stop there, 
however. Whilst the indigenous majority’s almost obsessional concern with social 
significance of some often quite small – but hereditarily acquired – differences in physical 
appearance may indeed be the principal precipitant of this penalty, and so – by the same 
token – ‘race’ in this sense must also be seen as the principal vehicle through which members 
of Britain’s self-identified White population currently practices exclusionary closure the 
better to defend its members’ position of relative privilege, it would be quite wrong to 
                                         
14 It is against this background that the significance of Steve Biko’s comment that “The most potent weapon in 
the hands of the oppressor is the mindof the oppressed” (I Write What I Like, London: Heinemann Educational, 
1978: 68) immediately springs to the fore.  
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conclude those who so identify themselves as ‘White’ entirely lack any kind of ethnic 
characteristics, or that they actually constitute anything like such a homogeneous body of 
people as their preferred vocabulary appears to suggest.  
 In the first place it is worth remembering that even though the minority group on 
which exclusionistic sentiments currently focus are f non-European descent, anti-immigrant 
exclusionism is no sense a novel phenomenon in Britain. On the contrary a whole series of 
less earlier groups of settlers, from the Huguenots to the Jews and then the Irish Catholics 
were – in their time – exposed to very similarly structured forms of exclusionism. In the 
second place once current disjunctions are placed within a broader time-frame, it soon 
becomes quite clear that Britain’s English (and I stress that identifier) majority are currently 
suffering from one of their recurrent bouts of paranoia about the extent to which the growth 
of ethnic pluralism presents an unacceptable threat to national integrity. Hence, for example, 
Mr. Norman (and now Lord) Tebbitt’s famed proposal that a ‘cricket test’ should be 
instituted to measure the extent of the new minorities’ loyalty to what he and his many 
supporters suggest is the very essence of the British/English nation. Members of Britain’s 
Jewish and Catholic population with any kind of historical memory will, of course, have 
heard this kind of argument before, and from this perspective it may well be that we are 
currently moving towards a much more historically precedented position, where structures of 
anti-immigrant and anti-minority exclusionism are articulted in much more explicitly ethnic 
terms.  
 However there is a further dimension of Lord Tebbitt’s cricket test (and other similar 
measures) which should not be overlooked: namely the extent to which it is grounded in a 
very English vision of how Britain’s ational identity is and should be constructed. Neither 
Scotland nor Wales have cricket teams at all, and it is clearly grossly presumptuous to assume 
that the inhabitants of these regions – or indeed people of Scots and Welsh descent who are 
now resident in England  – will, of necessity, be interested in cricket, or that they will be 
unquestioning supporters of the English team, and all the more so when the English so 
regularly, and so unthinkingly, treat the notions of British and English as synonymous. What 
this exposes is yet another similarly structured hegemonic relationship. As the Scots and the 
Welsh are very well aware, members of Britain’s English majority are for the most part 
exceedingly reluctant to acknowledge the existence, the legitimacy and indeed the 
significance of the distinctive ethno-national interests of the United Kingdom’s long-
suppressed regional minorities. We have come the full circle. The very taken-for-grantedn ss 
of current usage, which treats Whiteness/Englishness/Britishness as virtually ynonymous, 
has very large social consequences. Not only does it obscure the intrinsic plurality of the 
United Kingdom itself – of whose population the English are but one, albeit profoundly 
hegemonic, ethno-national component. It also has the effect of suppressing any conceptual 
awareness of Britain’s various regional minorities, such as the Welsh and the Scots, as well 
as others of less indigenous origins, such as the Jews, the Irish Catholics and the Traveller-
Gypsies, as forming trinsic omponents of Britain’s national whole. Moreover this also has 
the further effect of divide and rule. Since none of these “invisible” minorities are “ethnic” in 
the racial sense of the term, the non-European minorities are left looking uniquely distinctive; 
and despite the many parallels between the ways the two different categories of minority have 
in fact resisted exclusion, the invisible minorities’ “deviance” remains firmly backstage. 
Hence the possibility that more recently arrived minority groups might legitimately sustain, 
an alternative moral, cultural, linguistic and religious agenda is ruled firmly out of court on 
the grounds that they should emulate the assimilationist strategies of their predecessors, even 
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if their predecessors actually did nothing of the sort, and once encountered much the same 
kind of hostility as the new minorities do today. English hegemony rules!  
 All this has set the scene for yet more conceptual disasters, and nowhere have they 
been more so than with respect to White/English/British perceptions of the social experiences 
– and even more the intellectual, cultural and political capabilities – of non-European 
“others”. It is, of course, in the nature of hegemony that it denies that possibility that 
marginalised others will ever have the capacity to set rational agendas of their own, let alone 
to pursue them with any degree of success: as Steve Biko was well aware, it is on this basis 
that both exclusion and inequality are simultaneously justified, and its effects can even come 
to pollute its victims’ minds. But what is most striking about the vast majority of established 
critiques of racial inequality – or of “anti-racism”, in contemporary parlance – is just how 
much of the established agenda of English hegemony it implicitly accepts. Hence while 
sociological critics (of whom Valerie Karn is only the most immediate example to hand) 
quite rightly seek to emphasise just how much rank injustice is precipitated as a result of 
racial exclusionism, close inspection soon reveals that sh and mo t of her colleagues still fall 
into exactly the same hegemonic trap by failing to take the otherness of others seriously. And 
as long as their analytical models remain trapped within a conceptual paradigm which denies 
the creative possibilities of alterity, it becomes virtually impossible to concede that despite 
the crushing impact of exclusionism, the excluded will always find some means of resisting, 
or at least subverting, the preferred agendas of their excluders.  
 Contentious though this assertion may seem to some, I would nevertheless suggest 
that the results of the 1991 Census provide the clearest possible empirical evidence that this is 
indeed the case. Just as one might expect – at least within the context of the kind of analytical 
perspective which I have sought to develop here, the visible minorities ability to access some 
particularly rich stores of ethnic and cultural alterity has not only enabled them to move well 
beyond the situation of comprehensive disadvantage to which unresisted exposure to majority 
exclusionism would otherwise have consigned them, but has also precipitated increasingly 
varied trajectories of adaptation, and hence of upward mobility. That is precisely what the 
Census data is telling us. To be sure the task of working ut just how these increasingly 
varied outcomes have been precipitated by the interaction between a whole series of largely 
ethnically inspired processes of exclusion and usurpation remains exceedingly challenging, 
but what seems to be plain as a pikestaff is that Karn’s unidimensional concept of an “ethnic 
penalty” is a grossly inadequate tool for the job in hand. Worse still it seems to me that even 
though she may have the best of intentions she – and the many others who also follow this 
broad line of an lysis – has thrown the baby right out with the bathwater. That is not a good 
remedy for anyone’s health. 
 
Asking ethnic questions: the prospect for the future 
 
Just where do we go from here? The inclusion of an ethnic question in the 1991 Census – 
however flawed its formulation may have been – was undoubtedly a major step forward. It 
has at long last begun to put a critically important dimension of diversity onto the 
sociological and social policy map of Britain. At the same time the very complexity of the 
data which it has thrown up, even with respect to the very limited range of arenas which the 
question posed enables us to illuminate, together with the fact that it has emphatically not 
fulfilled the objectives of its original advocates – nam ly to produce a relatively 
straightforward measure of racial disadvantage – makes it quite clear that we have so far only 
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been able to broach the issues, and that we are still no-wh re near fully comprehending them. 
What is needed to achieve that goal?  
 A number of steps all seem equally crucial:  
¨ A recognition that because we in Britain live (and have long lived) in a plural society, and 
that ethnic affiliation of one form or another is a feature of ll sections of the population, 
and not just of the visible minorities. 
¨ That the presence of ethnic pluralism is consequently a long-standing and hence in all 
probability a permanent feature of the British social order 
¨ That data about ethnic affiliation is worth collecting not just as a means of assessing the 
extent of material inequality between our plural society’s various ethnic components , but 
also of taking cognizance of the varying priorities which members of each such group 
may be setting for themselves in organizing their personal and domestic lives  
¨ That a failure to do so yet further entrenches the hegemonic position of Britain’s 
dominant English majority. 
¨ That in a plural society all socio-economic outcomes will, by definition, be the product of 
a complex series of interactions between in-groupers’ own self-defined strategic priorities 
and of the external constraints to which they find themselves exposed, always 
remembering that one group’s exclusionary priorities may well be the principal source of 
another’s external constraints. 
¨ That any such an exercise is unlikely to be analytically productive as it should be until we 
establish a set of publicly accepted ethnic categories which quite explicitly include – 
whilst also differentiating between – all the many components of Britain’s population 
who are at present invi ed to identify themselves “White”.  
¨ That the whole purpose of such an exercise is not so much to explore issues of either 
“identity” or “origin” – given the exceedingly fickle conceptual foundations of both these 
terms – but rather to identify which of the many communities of which our manifestly 
plural society is now composed respondents feel themselves to be most closely affiliated 
¨ And to the extent that ethnic affiliation is determined from within, British-South Asian 
demands that the existence of further s b-divisions within their ranks – as, for example, 
between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, as well between Gujaratis, Sylhetis, Punjabis and 
Azad Kashmiris – should be met with a positive response, not least because a more 
closely focused exploration of ethnic affiliation in the belongers’ own terms would reveal 
an even higher degree of inter-mino ity diversity than that displayed in the Tables above. . 
¨ That in the absence of a much fuller – and much more technically satisfactory – 
disaggregation of ethnic affiliation than is currently on offer, comprehensive analyses of 
the multi-dimensional processes which have led different groups to follow widely varying 
socio-economic trajectories will remain beyond our grasp.  
 
This clearly constitutes a very much wider agenda than the Home Affairs Select Committee – 
and most of the other supporters of the introduction of an “Ethnic Group” question in the 
Census – initially envisaged. Judging by the majority of the analyses of the results of the 
1991 exercise which have so far appeared, it is also way beyond the conceptual paradigms 
which still underpin the greater part of the current sociological and social policy debate about 
these issues.15 
                                         
15 For a further analysis along much the same lines, but this time focussing on the more demographic dimensions 
of the underlying issues, see my review article entitle “The construction of a conceptual vision: ‘Ethnic Groups’ 
and the 1991 Census in Eth ic and Racial Studies Vol20, pp. 182 – 194.  
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 Yet what are the chances of overturning established – and from an English 
perspective, all too convenient – co ceptual paradigms? My own experience has made me 
ever more sceptical. Despite the urgency of the issues, progress is disappointingly slow. What 
seems quite clear is that in the absence of a radical improvement in both popular a d social 
scientific understandings of the dialectics of ethnic pluralism – and hence of the way in which 
on-going processes of adaptation and closure within each of our society’s many ethnic 
components are continuing to precipitate a diverse range of social and behavioural outcomes 
– we are unlikely to see much of a speed-up. Paradoxically enough sloganistic support for 
anti-racist policies – which themselves all too often offer little more than moralistic sympathy 
for the plight of the down-trodden and disadvantaged – is by no means incompatible with the 
maintenance of a conceptual framework which further supports (whether wittingly or 
unwittingly) well established structures of hegemonic ethnocentricity. By contrast taking 
alterity seriously, especially when that requires one to rethink one’s own deeply entrenched 
ethnic presuppositions, is a far more challenging task. Current developments offer few 
indications that this is yet being seriously addressed. 
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   Aged 18 -29  Aged 30 - 44  Aged 45 - 59 
Men Persons Percent Ratio Persons Percent Ratio Persons Percent Ratio 
Large employers 7 0.1 4.2 19 0.1 1.9 10 0.1 1.5 
Small employers  515 3.9 2.6 1755 10.6 2.0 908 9.4 1.6 
Self-employed professionals 83 0.6 1.7 524 3.2 1.5 418 4.3 1.9 
Self-employed non-professionals 976 7.3 0.9 2481 15.0 1.3 1299 13.4 1.1 
Managers in large establishments 337 2.5 0.7 831 5.0 0.5 404 4.2 0.4 
Managers in small establishments 960 7.2 1.0 1651 10.0 0.8 680 7.0 0.6 
Employed professionals  1092 8.2 1.4 1737 10.5 1.4 726 7.5 1.2 
Non-manual supervisiors 99 0.7 1.0 108 0.7 0.6 75 0.8 0.9 
Manual supervisiors 169 1.3 0.7 381 2.3 0.6 276 2.9 0.6 
Junior non-manual workers 2673 20.0 1.3 1653 10.0 1.1 850 8.8 1.2 
Ancilliary Workers 1257 9.4 1.0 1762 10.7 0.8 832 8.6 0.8 
Personal service workers 1132 8.5 3.1 928 5.6 5.7 384 4.0 5.2 
Skilled manual workers 2345 17.6 0.7 3430 20.7 0.9 2183 22.6 0.9 
Semi-skilled workers 2004 15.0 1.0 2714 16.4 1.5 2189 22.6 1.6 
Unskilled workers 548 4.1 0.8 636 3.8 1.2 748 7.7 1.8 
Farmers and agricultural workers 14 0.1 0.0 15 0.1 0.0 11 0.1 0.0 
Members of the armed forces 257 1.9 0.7 211 1.3 0.7 20 0.2 0.4 
 
Table 2: Distribution of economically active men by age group and socio-economic group, and ratios to their White counterparts. 
Source 1991 Census Ethnic Group and Country of Birth Topic Report, Table 16 
 *1.00= same proportion as Whites in hat socio-economic group;  0.5 = half as many; 2.0 = twice as many  
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   Aged 18 - 29  Aged 30 - 44  Aged 45 - 59 
Women Persons Percent Ratio Persons Percent Ratio Persons Percent Ratio 
Large employers 3 0.0 9.5 7 0.0 3.6 2 0.0 1.2 
Small employers  157 1.2 2.0 563 4.0 1.8 212 2.8 1.1 
Self-employed professionals 40 0.3 2.7 118 0.8 1.7 69 0.9 4.1 
Self-employed non-professionals 286 2.2 1.2 962 6.8 1.9 364 4.8 1.5 
Managers in large establishments 414 3.2 0.9 412 2.9 0.7 100 1.3 0.5 
Managers in small establishments 573 4.5 0.7 648 4.5 0.7 210 2.8 0.5 
Employed professionals  525 4.1 1.7 466 3.3 1.8 132 1.8 2.1 
Non-manual supervisiors 148 1.2 0.7 141 1.0 0.6 31 0.4 0.3 
Manual supervisiors 57 0.4 0.9 98 0.7 0.8 65 0.9 0.8 
Junior non-manual workers 6118 48.0 1.1 4296 30.2 0.8 1193 15.8 0.4 
Ancilliary Workers 1631 12.8 0.8 3120 21.9 1.0 2002 26.6 1.5 
Personal service workers 941 7.4 0.8 1059 7.4 0.9 702 9.3 1.0 
Skilled manual workers 229 1.8 0.6 411 2.9 1.2 249 3.3 1.2 
Semi-skilled workers 1381 10.8 1.2 2533 17.8 2.0 1722 22.9 2.1 
Unskilled workers 316 2.5 0.8 693 4.9 0.7 931 12.4 1.1 
Farmers and agricultural workers 17 0.1 0.2 14 0.1 0.1 15 0.2 0.2 
Members of the armed forces 35 0.3 0.7 26 0.2 2.1 0 0.0 0.0 
 
Table 3: Distribution of economically active women by age group and socio-ec n mic group, and ratios to their White counterparts. 
Source 1991 Census Ethnic Group and Country of Birth Topic Report, Table 16 
 *1.00= same proportion as Whites in that socio-econ mic group;  0.5 = half as many; 2.0 = twice as many  
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   Aged 18 - 29     Aged 30 - 44     Aged 45 - 59   
Men Afro-
Caribs 
Africans Indians Paki-
stanis 
Bangla-
deshis 
Chinese Afro-
Caribs 
Africans Indians Paki-
stanis 
Bangla-
deshis 
Chinese Afro-
Caribs 
Africans Indians Paki-
stanis 
Bangla-
deshis 
Chinese 
Large employers 0.0 0.0 11.6 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 3.5 1.6 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.0 0.0 6.8 
Small employers  0.5 0.3 3.4 4.0 6.9 5.9 0.5 0.5 2.2 2.8 5.7 6.1 0.4 0.5 1.8 2.5 3.9 7.5 
Self-employed professionals 0.2 2.0 4.0 0.8 0.0 1.7 0.4 1.1 2.3 1.0 0.7 2.1 0.1 1.3 3.5 2.0 2.4 2.5 
Self-employed non-
professionals 
0.6 0.6 1.2 1.7 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.5 2.2 0.7 1.7 0.7 0.7 1.3 1.6 0.7 2.8 
Managers in large 
establishments 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Managers in small 
establishments 
0.8 0.7 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.9 
Employed professionals  0.5 1.3 1.9 1.3 0.5 4.0 0.5 1.9 1.5 1.0 0.5 2.9 0.2 1.5 1.8 0.9 1.4 1.7 
Non-manual supervisiors 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.3 
Manual supervisiors 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.3 
Junior non-manual workers 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.3 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.4 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.1 
Ancilliary Workers 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.3 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.8 
Personal service workers 1.3 2.0 0.8 1.6 23.2 11.0 2.3 3.2 1.4 2.6 48.7 30.4 1.6 4.0 1.2 1.9 31.3 50.2 
Skilled manual workers 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.2 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.1 1.4 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.2 
Semi-skilled workers 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.6 0.5 0.2 1.4 1.2 1.8 2.2 1.1 0.2 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.5 0.3 
Unskilled workers 0.8 1.5 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.6 1.2 2.0 1.1 1.8 0.8 0.3 2.6 1.9 1.2 2.0 2.2 1.0 
Farmers and agricultural 
workers 
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Members of the armed forces 0.5 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 
 
Table 4: Ratios of economically active non-white men to their white counterparts by age group, ethnic group and s cio-economic 
group*.  
Source 1991 Census Ethnic Group and Country of Birth Topic Report, Table 16 
 
*1.00= same proportion as Whites in that socio-econ mic group; 0.5 = half as many; 2.0 = twice as many  
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    Aged 18 - 29     Aged 30 - 44     Aged 45 - 59   
Women Afro-
Caribs 
Africans Indians Paki-
stanis 
Bangla-
deshis 
Chinese Afro-
Caribs 
Africans Indians Paki-
stanis 
Banglad
eshis 
Chinese Afro-
Caribs 
Africans Indians Paki-
stanis 
Bangla-
deshis 
Chinese 
Large employers 0.0 0.0 19.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Small employers  0.3 0.2 2.7 4.7 3.3 6.7 0.2 0.4 2.2 4.8 1.1 6.6 0.1 0.3 1.7 4.6 0.0 5.4 
Self-employed professionals 0.7 1.8 4.4 2.6 0.0 2.3 0.5 1.2 2.4 3.1 1.8 2.6 0.0 0.9 7.7 26.3 28.9 3.3 
Self-employed non-
professionals 
0.3 0.7 1.6 3.3 1.9 2.4 0.4 0.8 2.7 4.3 1.0 4.5 0.3 0.7 2.9 5.4 2.0 3.5 
Managers in large 
establishments 
1.2 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.6 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.4 
Managers in small 
establishments 
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.4 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.4 
Employed professionals  0.6 1.8 2.3 1.3 0.4 6.6 0.6 2.0 1.9 1.8 3.8 3.7 0.2 1.2 4.0 3.0 15.6 3.0 
Non-manual supervisiors 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 
Manual supervisiors 0.7 1.5 1.0 1.6 0.0 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.1 0.5 1.0 0.4 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.2 
Junior non-manual workers 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Ancilliary Workers 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.2 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.4 2.0 2.1 0.8 1.2 1.9 1.3 
Personal service workers 0.9 1.2 0.3 0.5 1.8 2.4 0.8 1.4 0.5 0.9 1.8 1.9 1.1 1.3 0.4 0.9 0.7 2.6 
Skilled manual workers 0.5 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.3 0.0 0.8 0.8 1.9 1.5 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.6 2.0 1.2 1.5 0.4 
Semi-skilled workers 0.7 0.8 1.6 2.2 1.9 0.4 1.1 1.1 3.4 2.5 1.9 0.4 1.9 1.0 3.4 2.7 0.6 0.6 
Unskilled workers 0.6 2.9 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.1 0.6 1.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.7 1.1 
Farmers and agricultural 
workers 
0.2 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.8 
Members of the armed forces 0.3 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Table 5: Ratios of economically active non-white women to their white counterparts by age group, ethnic group and socio-eco omi  
group*.  
Source 1991 Census Ethnic Group and Country of Birth Topic Report, Table 16 
 
*1.00= same proportion as Whites in that socio-econ mic group; 0.5 = half as many; 2.0 = twice as many  
 
 
